The Question of Abortion
Abortion before the third trimester is not completely morally wrong. The fetus is not yet a person, as it has no consciousness, cannot reason, and cannot suffer. However, in accordance with virtue ethics, a person of moral character will have respect for the value, albeit lesser value, of a potential person. Therefore, a virtuous person will only undergo an abortion after careful consideration of the losses involved in abortion. To determine which abortions are moral, one must focus on the intentions involved, as well as the character traits driving those intentions. Overall, abortion should be the exception, not the rule.
The first problem to be solved when addressing the issue of abortion is whether the fetus has rights. For if the fetus does have an absolute right to life, this right cannot easily be outweighed by another’s right. This is seen in that an adult’s right to life is in most cases absolute, regardless of whether the reason for overriding the right is virtuous. Firstly, the idea that any person has rights must be established. According to Don Marquis, this is because they have a “valuable future”, one that includes happiness, experiences, etc. (Marquis, 1989) To take away that future is such a great loss, according to this article, that killing any being having such a possible future, human or not, is wrong. He uses these arguments to conclude that abortion is wrong, since the fetus does have a future of value. This is logical, as the fetus does have a future of value.
Practically, however, the present (or very close to it) is more important then the relatively distant future, because we do know what will happen in the present, contrary to the future. Therefore, we know that the adult woman is achieving the valuable future now, in the present. The fetus, on the other hand, has not yet attained that future. It may attain that future, but we do not know that something will not hinder it from attaining that future. The woman, on the other hand, attains it every new second. This argument, however, is only valid if the assumption that the fetus is not yet attaining the valuable future is true.
Only persons can be attaining a valuable future. Nonpersons may have a valuable future, as Marquis suggests, but they are not currently attaining it. Some argue that all biological humans are persons and have rights. But there must be a reason to limit personhood to humans. Why a snail has any less of a right to life than a human, for example, must be argued. One article uses the following criteria to define personhood: “consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, and self-concepts”. (
Many have argued that a fetus is a person from the point of conception. However, it is not even conscious and must be less of a person than even the ant who can at least suffer. And it most certainly cannot reason to any extent. Even if one wants to argue that a fetus has rights merely because it is biologically human, one must consider that the beginning fetus, at the embryonic stage, begins only as a single cell. Society has no qualms about killing individual human cells in the laboratory, such as when blood is removed to undergo DNA screening. These cells are all derived from the beginning cell at conception; they are only a later form of a zygote. Yet we do not consider them persons. We would only be concerned if removing the blood caused harm to the person. So a distinction has already been made between a person and a single human cell. And since a blood cell is nothing more than an aged zygote, it therefore follows that personhood cannot start at conception.
It cannot be entirely distinct when personhood begins. To say which hour a fetus becomes a person would be impossible. However, we can draw a line where we do know a fetus is not a person. If a being is not conscious and has never been, it is not a person. Again, even beings, which we do not consider persons, may have consciousness. One scientific study estimated fetal consciousness to begin at 30-35 weeks (Burgess and Tawia, 1996) However, it has been shown that fetuses may have memories as early as 22-23 weeks, right around or before the beginning of the third trimester. (Hepper, 1996) Scientifically, a fetus has not shown much conscious behavior before then. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that fetuses younger than this are definitely not persons.
Even if a fetus is not a person, one can argue that its potential to become one puts it upon the same level as a person. One commonly noted problem with the potential argument is that sperm and egg have the potential to become human; therefore, if it is wrong to kill a potential person, it is wrong to use contraception. But few would make this allowance, incurring a contradiction. Also, a potential professional musician does not have the same rights (i.e. privileges) a real professional musician does, and so forth. So why should a potential person have the same rights as a real person?
Therefore, in cases where the woman’s life is at stake, her right to life overrules the fetus’ right to life. This would also be true in cases where the fetus may be seriously detrimental to her health, as the value of her future, which is more important than the fetus’ future of value, is still at stake. It can be rebutted, however, that certain adults must then not be persons, in particular those with severe mental disabilities. They have no valuable future; they cannot even reason. However, persons or not, they are not imposing upon the rights of anyone else, making the argument, in a practical sense, not an issue. They also at least have consciousness, which makes the argument against their personhood more difficult.
Even though the right to life of a potential person does not outweigh the right to life of the mother, this is not to say that any right of the mother outweighs a potential person’s right to life. One article gives an example of a woman having an abortion merely for the sake of not postponing a trip to Europe (
This idea is supported by one article, which asserts that abortion is “morally weighty” (Little, 2003), not because it has “interests” which we should protect, such as with a person (since a nonperson cannot have interests), but because we should respect human life and the “impending relationship” it entails with the mother. This potential person has the ability to transform one’s identity into a mother, the author argues, and this alone is worthy of respect. This is true of any fetus, making any decision to abort a moral issue, despite the fact that it may not yet be a person. It is its potential for such a valuable existence, including human relationships, which creates this responsibility for a mother to respect the fetus. This does not mean that abortion in any case is wrong; it merely means that one should not take abortion lightly. It is the morality and intent of the mother that matters.
One argument favoring abortion in any case, however, is bodily autonomy. It is argued that a woman has a right to her own body and that the fetus is imposing on that right. This, however, is not the case. In consensual sex, there is also the consensus to the possibility of the loss of bodily autonomy for nine months. The woman is causing the existence and dependence of the fetus with full prior knowledge that this could occur. Not only should the fetus be respected for its potential life and the rights this entails, but a virtuous woman would also have compassion on the dependence of the fetus that she caused. She is responsible for the fetus, as she willingly engaged in an act that caused its existence, and this should be taken into consideration when deciding on an abortion.
In cases of rape, however, the woman did not consent to having her body be used by the fetus. In this case, we would have to retort to the violinist example. (Thomson, 1971) In this theoretical situation, a person is forcibly hooked up to a famous violinist to keep him alive. No matter how honorable it might be to keep the violinist alive by sacrificing the person’s bodily autonomy, it is not his/her responsibility, as he/she did not cause the violinist’s unfortunate position. Had the person caused the need for this dependence, however, the violinist would be the responsibility of this person. Reverting back to our real situation with the woman, it would be the woman’s responsibility in the same way if rape were not involved. This principle can be seen in legal cases where a person is responsible for their actions, such as in a lawsuit, even if he/she did not desire the outcome. All that is required is the responsibility for the situation. The woman had consensual sex, and in that is the responsibility for any possible pregnancy.
Virtue Theory Applied To Abortion
Virtue theory has been relevant throughout this discussion, and at this point, becomes more so. Since a potential person does have some rights (but the distinguishing of which are grey), there must now be determinations of which abortions are moral or immoral. This can be done using virtue theory. Virtue theory deals with the character of the agent rather than the outcome the agent produces. It is described that, “…the principal concern in a virtue-based approach is with what kind of person to be.” (Mappes and Degrazia, 2006) When determining what kind of person an agent is, that which are observed are the person’s motives and presence or lack of virtuous traits. It can be seen throughout society that a person’s intentions are focused on, even in legal cases. For example, if a person did not intend to commit a murder, they are held less accountable than the person who did intend it.
Virtue ethics would argue that these questions depend on the character of the woman making the decision. The abortion must be being made for a virtuous reason, exemplifying good character traits. While the example involving the trip to Europe is to most obviously not a virtuous reason for wanting an abortion, there are many cases where a woman does not want a child for a nontrivial reason, such as that she will not be able to finish up school, etc. Here responsibility becomes an issue. Responsibility is a virtue, as is selflessness. A virtuous woman would not try to escape her responsibility, which is to protect the child as long as it is in her care, for reasons of personal gain. This also, however, relates back to the issue of rape, where it is not the woman’s responsibility. So it would not be unvirtuous for a woman who was raped to abort before the fetus is a person, since she is not foregoing any responsibility.
There are other difficult cases, such as that the child that will be raised in an abusive environment or be subjected to severe poverty. It can therefore be argued that the child will have poor quality of life, and that it would be more virtuous to spare the child of such a negative life. On the contrary, it seems questionable to attempt to predict the future in that great of detail. Predicting that the child would be better off aborted is even presumptuous, as many have arisen from difficult circumstances. For example, it may have made sense for Harriett Tubman’s mother to consider an abortion (aside from the fact it would have been quite unsafe and illegal at this time), considering her seemingly set future as a slave. But one can see that she overcame these circumstances and actually ended up helping many others in her situation. And if a woman feels she cannot care for a future child, adoption does remain an option. It may not be an easy one, but it is the responsibility of any adult to consider it a possibility, as the woman did consensually choose her action of sex with its possible cause of pregnancy. A potential person still does have rights, and it is preferable to save its life if possible.
One exception is if the fetus did not have a valuable future whatsoever, and therefore no potential as well, such as in the cases of extreme birth defects, where the fetus will barely be conscious for the rest of its life. Then an abortion would be morally permissible, as the quality of life is unquestionably poor. The question that arises is how quality of life is to be assessed. Quality of life is certainly an issue in seriously deformed fetuses. If the life of a future person is to be filled with pain and suffering, and it is certain that it will never be able to feel any real joy, it does seem that abortion would be the merciful option. Mercy is most certainly a virtuous character trait, so in this instance, an early abortion would be a moral decision. However, as discussed above, it is impossible to accurately predict quality of life without absolute knowledge. Therefore an abortion for this reason should only be done if it is absolutely certain that the future child will not even be able to interact with its environment.
The distinguishing of morality in each case regarding these scenarios is certainly difficult. It would be impossible to make a law regarding all early abortions, given these exceptions. Since the early fetus is not a person, no murder is being committed. The killing of a potential person may not always be justified, but the line is much greyer than it is in murder. There are times, as discussed, such as when the woman’s life is at stake, or when the fetus is so deformed it would have a poor quality of life, that killing the fetus is actually the moral option.
Intention really is the key here, in accordance with virtue theory. If the woman is acting upon self-centered motives, the action is wrong, since she is infringing on the rights of the potential person, and the potential person is not infringing on a right of higher importance of her own. And in accordance with virtue theory, not only is she behaving in an immoral manner regarding rights, but she is also showing negative character. However, given a logical reason with good intentions, her action of overriding the potential person’s rights could be moral. It may be so, even if not best in retrospect.
This leads us to the distinction between the best choice and the moral choice, for what if a negative outcome is produced by a moral choice? While best choices are always moral, moral choices may not always be the best. Let us take an example of a mother and her child. The child wishes to go to a friend’s house, but the mother declines, as she does not know the parents well. However, for the sake of the example, let us imagine she somehow learns by hindsight that some sort of good would have come out of her letting the child go. Both choices would have been moral, as the mother’s intent was concern and love for her child. But the choice she did not happen to take was the best. It is the same in this issue. Intention is much more important than the actual outcome.
Also, the doctrine of double effect of virtue theory can be used to test reasoning for abortion decisions. This states that “…if an action had two effects, one good and the other evil…” (in this case the fetus was killed but the mother or even the fetus was benefited in whatever way) “…the evil effect was morally permitted: (1) if the action was good in itself or not evil, (2) if the good followed as immediately from the cause as did the evil effect, (3) if only the good effect was intended, and (4) if there was as important a reason for performing the action as for allowing the evil effect” (Pence, 2008) This can apply, for example, in cases where the mother’s life is at stake. The action of saving the mother was good (1); the saving of the mother’s life followed as soon as the fetus died (2); the intention was not to kill the fetus but to save the mother (3); and the mother’s life is actually more important than that of the fetus (4).
Legally, this all is difficult to assess. How do we know that the early abortion is being done in a moral manner? The hard fact is that the moral thing may not always be done. A judge can ask the woman for reasons as to why she should receive the early abortion, but reasons for any action can usually be created, true or not. This option would, practically, end up wasting a great deal of time and money, considering the current high abortion rate. Since late-term abortions seem highly questionable, as the fetus does seem to behave as a person, such as with the presence of memories, these should be outlawed. Abortions before the third trimester would be then left up to the mother, considering the absence of personhood. It would be her responsibility to ensure virtuous reasoning is used. This is the most specific the law can hope to achieve.
To conclude, my assertions are that an abortion after the second trimester is just as wrong as killing a person is, but that abortions before the third trimester are much more uncertain. Since the fetus is not a person, it is not as wrong as killing a person. However, it does have the potential to become a person, and that potential for life should be respected. Nonetheless, actual person’s rights to life overrule the potential person’s right to life. In cases of rape, the right to bodily autonomy also overrules the potential person’s right to life. Finally, fetuses that do not have a valuable future, and therefore no potential for personhood, may fall into the category where abortion is moral for the sake of mercy and not immoral due to the lack of rights. In most other cases, abortion is unnecessary and usually immoral, but, since the law cannot distinguish between every case, the final decision in early abortions should be left up to the mother. Virtue ethics is the most useful moral theory in understanding this issue and distinguishing between hard cases, as it is the intentions and character traits of the woman that matter most.
Literature Cited
Burgess JA, and Tawia SA. (1996) When did you first begin to feel it? -- locating the beginning of human consciousness. Bioethics, Vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1-26.
Hepper, PG. (1996) Fetal memory: Does it exist? What does it do?. Acta Paediatrica Supplement, Vol. 416, pp. 16-20.
Little, Margaret Olivia. (2003) The Morality of Abortion. A Companion to Applied Ethics pp. 319-324.
Mappes, Thomas A. and Degrazia, David. Biomedical Ethics.
Marquis, Don. (1989) Why Abortion is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 183-202.
Pence, Gregory E. Medical Ethics: Accounts of the Cases That Shaped and Defined Medical Ethics.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1971) A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 47.
Warren, Mary. (1973) On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. The Monist, Vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 43-61.
No comments:
Post a Comment