Individuality and Stem Cell Research

Individuality and Stem Cell Research

Stem cell research has a great potential to save lives, as these cells can potentially transform into any tissue in the body, possibly providing a cure for many diseases. It is an extremely controversial issue in medicine, however, because in order to obtain the best kind of stem cells, human embryos must be destroyed. Another controversial source of stem cells comes from the germ cells of an aborted fetus. Adult stem cells, which involve no destruction of life, do exist, but they have some limitations that scientists believe only embryonic and fetal stem cells can overcome. While many argue that embryonic stem cell research is wrong because it destroys a human individual, this cannot be so as the embryo at this stage has the potential to become multiple individuals. So individuality cannot yet exist. Fetal stem cells are more objectionable, on the other hand, since the fetus is a definite individual. However, it is not a person, and so if virtuous reasoning is used on all sides, it can be morally acceptable. Using the doctrine of double effect, one can see that a fetus may be aborted, if virtues, such as compassion, are used. Then stem cells can then be derived from these fetuses. Regulations must be in place, however, since a potential person does deserve respect and should not be aborted for reasons of money or for research alone.

Embryonic stem cells are cells that can be derived from very young embryos, about five days after fertilization, called a blastocyst. These cells have the ability to become (or differentiate) into nearly any type of cell in the body. They are therefore pluripotent. (NIH, 2000) Since they can develop into so many types of cells, they could serve to treat many diseases. For example, if a person’s heart is damaged, scientists hope to one day be able to implant pluripotent stem cells into that patient’s heart and coax them into becoming healthy heart cells. This might also be possible for diabetics, where the pancreas is not making insulin properly. Pluripotent cells can also be derived from fetuses, but they are a little more differentiated. They are further on their way to becoming particular types of cells. This can actually be beneficial, as they are more predictable. There is the potential problem, for example, that one might implant embryonic stem cells into a heart and have liver cells form, especially since the science is not completely understood. Both have their advantages and disadvantages.

Many people find this troubling, because these stem cells involve killing an embryo, which some people attribute human dignity to. An alternative that has been suggested is adult stem cells. These cells are only multipotent, in that they can only give rise to the types of tissue that they are derived from. They still can divide into many cells, but only into the type of cell they already are. Adult stem cells have not been found for every tissue type, and they cannot divide infinitely as embryonic stem cells can. They have been shown in some cases to even have pluripotent capabilities, however, but only for a few tissues and only in animals (NIH, 2000).

Some opponents argue that embryonic stem cell research is only a futuristic hope that may never be realized. Fetal stem cells have been shown in animals to be able to proliferate in a damaged spinal cord region, which would help treat Lou Gehrig's disease. (Devitt, 2007) Retinal disease has also been shown in rats to be treatable, and it is likely that this could extend to humans. (Devitt, 2007)

Arguments against embryonic stem cell research pertain to the fact that a human life is being destroyed. Admittedly, a human life is being destroyed. The cell is alive, and it is human. But what about destroying a human life is intrinsically wrong? Why is killing a human life worse than killing, say, an insect? Personhood is the main reason killing a human life is wrong. We value the unique person a human is – the fact that we can experience the world, reason, be self-aware, etc. Warren (1973) defines personhood as having at least one of the following: “consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, and self-concepts”. It seems consciousness is a reasonable requisite for personhood, and since most would consider a conscious insect not a person, probably another criterion as well. Even with this minimal requirement, the embryo certainly cannot be a person, since it is not even conscious.

Marquis (1989) would argue against this, because it has a “future of value”. Even if the embryo is not a person, according to Marquis, we should value it for its future. We value adult human life for the capacity it has to feel emotions, experience the world, and so forth. Therefore, we should value such a future to do so as well. However, the embryo could have two, or possibly even three or more futures of value in the case of identical twins/triplets, etc., as embryonic stem cell research uses embryos before the stage of possible twinning (14 days) (Oduncu, 2003). Ford (1991) argues that the embryo is not even an individual yet, for this very reason. Since the embryo may be either one individual or two individuals, it is nonsensical to claim that an embryo is both a potential person and potentially two persons. It could be either, so it has the potential to be both. It therefore could have two or more futures of value. Since this does not make sense, Ford claims that the embryo is not an individual yet at all. This is logical, and the embryo therefore has no moral status, as it is so far removed from personhood (it cannot even have that potential yet), that it is equivalent to a sperm or egg. Individuality is an essential characteristic of a human being, a characteristic that cannot be removed from any human being, and so the embryo is not yet even a human being. This is not to say that it is not a human cell, but it is not an actual human individual, just as an egg is a human cell, but not a human being. Therefore, if contraception is not wrong, embryonic stem cell research is not wrong either, and Marqui’s argument cannot apply to embryos.

Holm (2003) contends that this research should not be permitted because it could justify the use of an embryo, fetus, or infant for any purpose, even an “anti-wrinkle cream”. He is arguing that we could become frivolous and disrespectful in our use of human life. The first point, however, is invalid, because infants may already be persons, as might be fetuses (depending upon the stage of development), as they are conscious, and therefore may be persons. It would be the same with a person who is mentally incapacitated. They are still at least conscious, so, using Warren’s criteria, they may be persons.

The point of the “anti-wrinkle cream” is also not valid, since there is no difference between an embryo and another collection of human cells. As it is not even a human individual, it would be morally equivalent to use it for such a seemingly frivolous purpose as to use a blood cell for such a purpose. So there would be no problem with the scenario he gives. Even if this was an issue, (and it is not) embryonic stem cell research is not intending to use embryos for frivolous reasons. The whole point is to produce cures that will help many actual persons. Not only is no person, and actually no individual, being killed, but one can also see that, in accordance with virtue ethics, the researcher is using good character traits such as healing and beneficence.

Holm, does however, make an interesting point regarding the arguments against stem cell research. He argues that if the embryo is equivalent to a newborn baby at conception, then not only would abortions be immoral even in cases of rape, but research should be done to save the many embryos that women miscarry before they even know they are pregnant. If all life is sacred from the moment of conception, we should be putting as much effort into saving these embryos as we do into saving infants. If a similar number of infants were succumbing to a similar physiological situation, where they died immediately before being born, scientists would be working hectically to find a cure. We do not do this, however, for embryos. Therefore even sanctity of life theorists place lesser value on the embryo than the infant.

Embryos for research generally come from embryos that will already be destroyed from the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF). When a couple is infertile, they can opt to use IVF to create an embryo from the parents’ sperm and egg outside of the womb. However, since this process is very expensive, doctors usually create several embryos to make sure the process works the first time. Then only one or a few embryos are implanted and the rest are either discarded or frozen indefinitely. So embryonic stem cell research is only trying to use embryos that are already going to be destroyed. It will benefit many others, and the embryos would die anyway. However, I will argue later that it is even permissible to create embryos that would not otherwise be created for research.

Another point of note is that many opponents of embryonic stem cell research are not opposed to IVF. America creates thousands of embryos for the purpose of treating infertility, but the same country refuses not only to create them but also to use public funding to cure diseases with already created ones. This does not make any sense. Both result in the destruction of embryos. This is a cultural phenomenon, probably associated with uneasiness regarding any new scientific research. America is fine with it if it aids in reproductive freedom, but contradicts itself in prohibiting potentially life-saving research.

Clarke (2004) argues this point and extends it that it is not consistent to maintain that surplus embryos may be used for research and to maintain that embryos may not be created for research. Some argue this, claiming we may morally use surplus embryos from IVF, but not embryos created for the sole purpose of research. He points out that even if one uses the doctrine of double effect of virtue ethics, that the act may be good since the bad effect is not intended, it can apply to both cases. The first allows IVF for the good of having a child, completely knowing the surplus embryos will be destroyed. The second allows research for the good of saving lives, also knowing that the embryo will be destroyed. Therefore, one who is opposed to embryonic stem cell research must also be opposed to IVF. And if one is not opposed to IVF, one cannot logically be opposed to creating embryos for research alone.

It is also not consistent to appeal to using only surplus embryos, as you are still killing the embryo. Under the assumption that it is wrong to kill an embryo, you are doing the act either way. For example, if someone were to capture you, and tell you that you must kill another innocent person to save your life; most people would not consider that moral. No one would ask whether or not that person would be killed anyway. It would not matter. You killing the person would be wrong whether or not the person would or would not die anyway.

It is the same with embryos. It does not matter whether the embryo would be killed anyway (you create it to be killed when it wouldn’t have been otherwise vs. it is already created and will be killed). You are still doing the act of killing. Therefore, it comes down to personhood. It is wrong to kill the person in the example because he/she has dignity and value in their personhood. Embryos, for the reasons already mentioned, are not persons, and do not even yet have a potential to become so.

So while an embryo is not even an individual with the potential for personhood, a fetus certainly is. It is a distinct individual, and it has at least has the potential for personhood. At some point, it even becomes a person, as it is considered a person at birth. So at some point, the fetus must become a person. However, a potential person, or a fetus before this point, may not have the same moral rights as an actual person. So it becomes imperative to pinpoint at which point it definitely is not a person. While the exact time an individual reaches personhood will probably remain unknown for some time, we can define at what points of development a fetus is definitely not a person.

Since consciousness seems the minimal requirement for personhood, as discussed with the embryo, a fetus at a stage before it is conscious would not be a person. Studies have shown that a fetus may form memories around 22-23 weeks, which indicates consciousness. (Hepper, 1996) However, no studies have shown much evidence of fetal consciousness prior to this point. Holm (2003) argues, however, that personhood cannot be defined at one point, as if given one definition of personhood; a being may go in and out of being a person. However, we need not define the exact moment of personhood. We need only to define when a being is absolutely not a person. And it is fairly reasonable to say that a being that is not and never has been conscious is not a person.

So using tissue from an aborted fetus before the end of the second trimester would not involve aborting a person. But it does still involve killing a potential person. Potential persons do not have the same rights as persons because they only have the potential to become so. For instance, a twelve-year old, who has excellent athletic skills, has the potential to become a professional baseball player. But he is not treated as if he is an actual baseball player. So killing a potential person is not the same as killing an actual person.

Even if it is less problematic, killing a potential person is still a serious matter, due to the respect for the potential person it will become. Virtue ethics becomes important here. Virtue ethics regards the character traits of a person, and takes those good (or bad) traits into consideration when determining whether an act is right or wrong. In virtue ethics, the act may be right if the intentions are right. This can apply to abortions, and therefore, it is the intentions of the woman that matters. Potential persons still have rights, as they do have a future of value, as Marquis argues (unlike an embryo).

Abortions should not be taken lightly, and, in accordance with virtue ethics, should only be done when intentions are good. Aborting fetuses for research purposes is probably not the best solution, as this could lead to women aborting because a researcher has offered her money for the stem cells of her fetus. Money is certainly not a good reason to abort, as greed is definitely not a virtue. It could also lead to the idea that any life should be sacrificed for the greater good, as fetuses, even before the third trimester, are so close to being persons. Embryos, on the other hand, are simply a collection of cells and not even a human individual with the potential to be a person. Therefore, their use would not lead to such a distortion of thinking. So abortions should never be done for research purposes alone.

However, abortions, which have already taken place for other reasons, could offer life-saving stem cells. It would not be immoral to use these stem cells, as the researcher is intending good out of stem cell research, and there is no monetary interest involved. It is impossible to know if the woman aborted for virtuous reasons, so this should be left up to her, since the fetus is not yet a person. There is simply no way to know if she used virtuous reasons, and there may be instances when an abortion is virtuous. An example is when the fetus will have an extreme birth defect that will highly compromise its quality of life. So these fetuses could be used in research, as the researcher is using the virtue of trying to help the sick. The researcher would neither be using the fetus with bad motives, nor would he/she be encouraging the mother to do so.

One can use the doctrine of double effect of virtue theory here, stating that an act may be good if the good is intended and the evil is not. The intention may be good on the part of the mother, using compassion, etc., and another intention is to help cure the ailing, which is also good. The evil effect, of the aborted fetus being killed, is not necessarily intended. It is a necessary side effect of obtaining the good. (saving a child from a bad type of life, healing the sick, etc.) So in some cases, abortions, and fetal stem cell research, can be justified.

However, if embryonic stem cells can be used, they should be, as they are less morally troublesome. On the other hand, fetal stem cells have differentiated more, and are therefore more predictable. It is less likely that they will grow the wrong type of stem cells when implanted. So in cases where embryonic stem cells may be dangerous to the patient, since exactly how they will act is not known, fetal stem cells may be permissible. Research on them would probably also be necessary, as this problem may not be overcome for some time, and we would need to know how to use fetal stem cells in the meantime. It again depends on the intentions and virtues involved, particularly on the part of the researcher. However, research should also be focused on making embryonic stem cells more predictable to eventually avoid using aborted fetuses at all.

Embryonic stem cell research is a promising advance in medical technology. It has the capability to save many lives, and has already proven its value in some cases. Adult stem cells do have uses, but they do not match embryonic stem cells in their capabilities. Despite the conflict surrounding it, embryonic stem cells are not morally problematic. They are not yet human individuals, and they have no moral status. However, stem cells derived from fetuses should not be used if embryonic stem cells can be, as fetuses still are potential persons. In some cases, however, their use may be required, and virtue ethics would need to be used in their derivation. The intentions of both the mother and the doctor must be moral, and the abortion should not be done for research or monetary purposes to avoid a slippery slope problem. Embryonic stem cells are completely moral to use for research, and they have the potential to save many lives.

Literature Cited

Clarke, Simon. (2004) Ethical Consistency in Embryonic Stem Cell Research. New Zealand Bioethics Journal. Vol. 5, no. 1, pp. pp. 343-346.

Devitt, Terri. (2007) Stem cell therapy rescues motor neurons in ALS model. 20 November 2007 <http://www.news.wisc.edu/packages/stemcells/13974>

Ford, Norman. (1991) When Did I Begin? University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain.

Hepper, PG. (1996) Fetal memory: Does it exist? What does it do?. Acta Paediatrica Supplement, Vol. 416, pp. 16-20.

Holm, Soren. (2003) The Ethical Case Against Stem Cell Research. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. Vol. 12, pp. 372-383.

Marquis, Don. (1989) Why Abortion is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 183-202.

NIH. (2000). Stem Cells: A Primer.

Oduncu, Fuat, S. (2003) Stem cell research in Germany: Ethics of healing vs. human dignity. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. Vol. 6, pp. 5-16.

Warren, Mary. (1973) On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. The Monist, Vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 43-61.

The Question of Abortion

The Question of Abortion

Abortion before the third trimester is not completely morally wrong. The fetus is not yet a person, as it has no consciousness, cannot reason, and cannot suffer. However, in accordance with virtue ethics, a person of moral character will have respect for the value, albeit lesser value, of a potential person. Therefore, a virtuous person will only undergo an abortion after careful consideration of the losses involved in abortion. To determine which abortions are moral, one must focus on the intentions involved, as well as the character traits driving those intentions. Overall, abortion should be the exception, not the rule.

The first problem to be solved when addressing the issue of abortion is whether the fetus has rights. For if the fetus does have an absolute right to life, this right cannot easily be outweighed by another’s right. This is seen in that an adult’s right to life is in most cases absolute, regardless of whether the reason for overriding the right is virtuous. Firstly, the idea that any person has rights must be established. According to Don Marquis, this is because they have a “valuable future”, one that includes happiness, experiences, etc. (Marquis, 1989) To take away that future is such a great loss, according to this article, that killing any being having such a possible future, human or not, is wrong. He uses these arguments to conclude that abortion is wrong, since the fetus does have a future of value. This is logical, as the fetus does have a future of value.

Practically, however, the present (or very close to it) is more important then the relatively distant future, because we do know what will happen in the present, contrary to the future. Therefore, we know that the adult woman is achieving the valuable future now, in the present. The fetus, on the other hand, has not yet attained that future. It may attain that future, but we do not know that something will not hinder it from attaining that future. The woman, on the other hand, attains it every new second. This argument, however, is only valid if the assumption that the fetus is not yet attaining the valuable future is true.

Only persons can be attaining a valuable future. Nonpersons may have a valuable future, as Marquis suggests, but they are not currently attaining it. Some argue that all biological humans are persons and have rights. But there must be a reason to limit personhood to humans. Why a snail has any less of a right to life than a human, for example, must be argued. One article uses the following criteria to define personhood: “consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, and self-concepts”. (Warren, 1973) The author argues that a being must have at least one of these, though not all, to be a person. It seems reasonable to claim that at least consciousness is needed. Even an ant has consciousness and even the ability to suffer; yet we do not consider it a person. So while we may not be able to pinpoint exactly who is and who is not a person, we do know that a being not even having consciousness cannot be a person.

Many have argued that a fetus is a person from the point of conception. However, it is not even conscious and must be less of a person than even the ant who can at least suffer. And it most certainly cannot reason to any extent. Even if one wants to argue that a fetus has rights merely because it is biologically human, one must consider that the beginning fetus, at the embryonic stage, begins only as a single cell. Society has no qualms about killing individual human cells in the laboratory, such as when blood is removed to undergo DNA screening. These cells are all derived from the beginning cell at conception; they are only a later form of a zygote. Yet we do not consider them persons. We would only be concerned if removing the blood caused harm to the person. So a distinction has already been made between a person and a single human cell. And since a blood cell is nothing more than an aged zygote, it therefore follows that personhood cannot start at conception.

It cannot be entirely distinct when personhood begins. To say which hour a fetus becomes a person would be impossible. However, we can draw a line where we do know a fetus is not a person. If a being is not conscious and has never been, it is not a person. Again, even beings, which we do not consider persons, may have consciousness. One scientific study estimated fetal consciousness to begin at 30-35 weeks (Burgess and Tawia, 1996) However, it has been shown that fetuses may have memories as early as 22-23 weeks, right around or before the beginning of the third trimester. (Hepper, 1996) Scientifically, a fetus has not shown much conscious behavior before then. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that fetuses younger than this are definitely not persons.

Even if a fetus is not a person, one can argue that its potential to become one puts it upon the same level as a person. One commonly noted problem with the potential argument is that sperm and egg have the potential to become human; therefore, if it is wrong to kill a potential person, it is wrong to use contraception. But few would make this allowance, incurring a contradiction. Also, a potential professional musician does not have the same rights (i.e. privileges) a real professional musician does, and so forth. So why should a potential person have the same rights as a real person?

Therefore, in cases where the woman’s life is at stake, her right to life overrules the fetus’ right to life. This would also be true in cases where the fetus may be seriously detrimental to her health, as the value of her future, which is more important than the fetus’ future of value, is still at stake. It can be rebutted, however, that certain adults must then not be persons, in particular those with severe mental disabilities. They have no valuable future; they cannot even reason. However, persons or not, they are not imposing upon the rights of anyone else, making the argument, in a practical sense, not an issue. They also at least have consciousness, which makes the argument against their personhood more difficult.

Even though the right to life of a potential person does not outweigh the right to life of the mother, this is not to say that any right of the mother outweighs a potential person’s right to life. One article gives an example of a woman having an abortion merely for the sake of not postponing a trip to Europe (Warren, 1973). The author argues that since the fetus is not a person, the woman’s right prevails. But this makes no sense. We respect personhood because we believe they are attaining that valuable future. Therefore, the respect for the potential personhood the fetus does have gives it a right to life. It is a lesser right, but it still exists.

This idea is supported by one article, which asserts that abortion is “morally weighty” (Little, 2003), not because it has “interests” which we should protect, such as with a person (since a nonperson cannot have interests), but because we should respect human life and the “impending relationship” it entails with the mother. This potential person has the ability to transform one’s identity into a mother, the author argues, and this alone is worthy of respect. This is true of any fetus, making any decision to abort a moral issue, despite the fact that it may not yet be a person. It is its potential for such a valuable existence, including human relationships, which creates this responsibility for a mother to respect the fetus. This does not mean that abortion in any case is wrong; it merely means that one should not take abortion lightly. It is the morality and intent of the mother that matters.

One argument favoring abortion in any case, however, is bodily autonomy. It is argued that a woman has a right to her own body and that the fetus is imposing on that right. This, however, is not the case. In consensual sex, there is also the consensus to the possibility of the loss of bodily autonomy for nine months. The woman is causing the existence and dependence of the fetus with full prior knowledge that this could occur. Not only should the fetus be respected for its potential life and the rights this entails, but a virtuous woman would also have compassion on the dependence of the fetus that she caused. She is responsible for the fetus, as she willingly engaged in an act that caused its existence, and this should be taken into consideration when deciding on an abortion.

In cases of rape, however, the woman did not consent to having her body be used by the fetus. In this case, we would have to retort to the violinist example. (Thomson, 1971) In this theoretical situation, a person is forcibly hooked up to a famous violinist to keep him alive. No matter how honorable it might be to keep the violinist alive by sacrificing the person’s bodily autonomy, it is not his/her responsibility, as he/she did not cause the violinist’s unfortunate position. Had the person caused the need for this dependence, however, the violinist would be the responsibility of this person. Reverting back to our real situation with the woman, it would be the woman’s responsibility in the same way if rape were not involved. This principle can be seen in legal cases where a person is responsible for their actions, such as in a lawsuit, even if he/she did not desire the outcome. All that is required is the responsibility for the situation. The woman had consensual sex, and in that is the responsibility for any possible pregnancy.

Virtue Theory Applied To Abortion

Virtue theory has been relevant throughout this discussion, and at this point, becomes more so. Since a potential person does have some rights (but the distinguishing of which are grey), there must now be determinations of which abortions are moral or immoral. This can be done using virtue theory. Virtue theory deals with the character of the agent rather than the outcome the agent produces. It is described that, “…the principal concern in a virtue-based approach is with what kind of person to be.” (Mappes and Degrazia, 2006) When determining what kind of person an agent is, that which are observed are the person’s motives and presence or lack of virtuous traits. It can be seen throughout society that a person’s intentions are focused on, even in legal cases. For example, if a person did not intend to commit a murder, they are held less accountable than the person who did intend it.

Virtue ethics would argue that these questions depend on the character of the woman making the decision. The abortion must be being made for a virtuous reason, exemplifying good character traits. While the example involving the trip to Europe is to most obviously not a virtuous reason for wanting an abortion, there are many cases where a woman does not want a child for a nontrivial reason, such as that she will not be able to finish up school, etc. Here responsibility becomes an issue. Responsibility is a virtue, as is selflessness. A virtuous woman would not try to escape her responsibility, which is to protect the child as long as it is in her care, for reasons of personal gain. This also, however, relates back to the issue of rape, where it is not the woman’s responsibility. So it would not be unvirtuous for a woman who was raped to abort before the fetus is a person, since she is not foregoing any responsibility.

There are other difficult cases, such as that the child that will be raised in an abusive environment or be subjected to severe poverty. It can therefore be argued that the child will have poor quality of life, and that it would be more virtuous to spare the child of such a negative life. On the contrary, it seems questionable to attempt to predict the future in that great of detail. Predicting that the child would be better off aborted is even presumptuous, as many have arisen from difficult circumstances. For example, it may have made sense for Harriett Tubman’s mother to consider an abortion (aside from the fact it would have been quite unsafe and illegal at this time), considering her seemingly set future as a slave. But one can see that she overcame these circumstances and actually ended up helping many others in her situation. And if a woman feels she cannot care for a future child, adoption does remain an option. It may not be an easy one, but it is the responsibility of any adult to consider it a possibility, as the woman did consensually choose her action of sex with its possible cause of pregnancy. A potential person still does have rights, and it is preferable to save its life if possible.

One exception is if the fetus did not have a valuable future whatsoever, and therefore no potential as well, such as in the cases of extreme birth defects, where the fetus will barely be conscious for the rest of its life. Then an abortion would be morally permissible, as the quality of life is unquestionably poor. The question that arises is how quality of life is to be assessed. Quality of life is certainly an issue in seriously deformed fetuses. If the life of a future person is to be filled with pain and suffering, and it is certain that it will never be able to feel any real joy, it does seem that abortion would be the merciful option. Mercy is most certainly a virtuous character trait, so in this instance, an early abortion would be a moral decision. However, as discussed above, it is impossible to accurately predict quality of life without absolute knowledge. Therefore an abortion for this reason should only be done if it is absolutely certain that the future child will not even be able to interact with its environment.

The distinguishing of morality in each case regarding these scenarios is certainly difficult. It would be impossible to make a law regarding all early abortions, given these exceptions. Since the early fetus is not a person, no murder is being committed. The killing of a potential person may not always be justified, but the line is much greyer than it is in murder. There are times, as discussed, such as when the woman’s life is at stake, or when the fetus is so deformed it would have a poor quality of life, that killing the fetus is actually the moral option.

Intention really is the key here, in accordance with virtue theory. If the woman is acting upon self-centered motives, the action is wrong, since she is infringing on the rights of the potential person, and the potential person is not infringing on a right of higher importance of her own. And in accordance with virtue theory, not only is she behaving in an immoral manner regarding rights, but she is also showing negative character. However, given a logical reason with good intentions, her action of overriding the potential person’s rights could be moral. It may be so, even if not best in retrospect.

This leads us to the distinction between the best choice and the moral choice, for what if a negative outcome is produced by a moral choice? While best choices are always moral, moral choices may not always be the best. Let us take an example of a mother and her child. The child wishes to go to a friend’s house, but the mother declines, as she does not know the parents well. However, for the sake of the example, let us imagine she somehow learns by hindsight that some sort of good would have come out of her letting the child go. Both choices would have been moral, as the mother’s intent was concern and love for her child. But the choice she did not happen to take was the best. It is the same in this issue. Intention is much more important than the actual outcome.

Also, the doctrine of double effect of virtue theory can be used to test reasoning for abortion decisions. This states that “…if an action had two effects, one good and the other evil…” (in this case the fetus was killed but the mother or even the fetus was benefited in whatever way) “…the evil effect was morally permitted: (1) if the action was good in itself or not evil, (2) if the good followed as immediately from the cause as did the evil effect, (3) if only the good effect was intended, and (4) if there was as important a reason for performing the action as for allowing the evil effect” (Pence, 2008) This can apply, for example, in cases where the mother’s life is at stake. The action of saving the mother was good (1); the saving of the mother’s life followed as soon as the fetus died (2); the intention was not to kill the fetus but to save the mother (3); and the mother’s life is actually more important than that of the fetus (4).

Legally, this all is difficult to assess. How do we know that the early abortion is being done in a moral manner? The hard fact is that the moral thing may not always be done. A judge can ask the woman for reasons as to why she should receive the early abortion, but reasons for any action can usually be created, true or not. This option would, practically, end up wasting a great deal of time and money, considering the current high abortion rate. Since late-term abortions seem highly questionable, as the fetus does seem to behave as a person, such as with the presence of memories, these should be outlawed. Abortions before the third trimester would be then left up to the mother, considering the absence of personhood. It would be her responsibility to ensure virtuous reasoning is used. This is the most specific the law can hope to achieve.

To conclude, my assertions are that an abortion after the second trimester is just as wrong as killing a person is, but that abortions before the third trimester are much more uncertain. Since the fetus is not a person, it is not as wrong as killing a person. However, it does have the potential to become a person, and that potential for life should be respected. Nonetheless, actual person’s rights to life overrule the potential person’s right to life. In cases of rape, the right to bodily autonomy also overrules the potential person’s right to life. Finally, fetuses that do not have a valuable future, and therefore no potential for personhood, may fall into the category where abortion is moral for the sake of mercy and not immoral due to the lack of rights. In most other cases, abortion is unnecessary and usually immoral, but, since the law cannot distinguish between every case, the final decision in early abortions should be left up to the mother. Virtue ethics is the most useful moral theory in understanding this issue and distinguishing between hard cases, as it is the intentions and character traits of the woman that matter most.

Literature Cited

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